Abstract. On the basis of ample empirical evidence for German manufacturing, this paper investigates the relevant incentives for (1) the adoption of an Environmental Management System (EMS) in a facility and (2) its environmental innovation behavior. Specifically, we test whether or not EMS-certification has a positive impact on a facility's environmental innovation activities. This question is analyzed on the basis of a recursive bivariate probit model that explicitly takes into account that a facility's decision on innovation activities is correlated with the decision on EMS-certification. Our empirical results indicate that neither EMS-certification nor any other policy instrument appears to affect environmental innovation activities. These results support the hypothesis that policy style -including strictness of regulation -is more important for innovation than the proper choice an appropriate policy instrument. 
Introduction
In contrast to conventional innovations, environmental innovations produce a double rather than single externality -see e. g. Carraro (2000) and Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2002) : Besides providing the typical positive spill-overs of R&D activities, environmental innovations in production may reduce negative environmental externalities. Although in some cases there are clear market-based incentives to improve environmental performance, e. g. cost savings created by process improvements, the public good character of environmental innovations necessitates governmental interventions for their stimulation. In particular for Germany, considerable empirical effort has been spent on the identification of characteristics, determinants, and obstacles of environmental innovations at the firm level, with the focus on the role of environmental policy -see Rennings (2000) . Since the early 1990s, Environmental Management Systems (EMS), specifically, have become a vital voluntary supplement to mandatory environmental policies based on regulation and legislation. As an organizational environmental innovation, EMS may lead to improved environmental performance, and indeed, the econometric analysis of a recent investigation by Rennings et al. (2003) Except for a few studies, however, such as Rennings et al. (2003) , the respective German literature is dominated by case studies. Yet, case studies do not provide a general assessment of the impact of EMS on innovative activity. Apparently, there is a lack of empirical studies based on large-scale surveys at the firm-level that allow for application of econometric methods on the issue of incentives for environmental innovation activity. By contrast, there is a substantial body of international empirical literature on environmental innovation and proactive factors that trigger organizational environmental innovation activities of firms, such as voluntary adoption of environmental plans and EMS.
The article of Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) is an early example. Their empirical study for Canada finds that customer, shareholder, government regulatory, and community group pressures positively influence the environmental responsiveness of a firm, which is defined as: "a firm [that] has formulated an official plan for dealing with environmental issues" (Henriques and Sadorsky (1996:382) ). Negative influences include lobby group pressures and firms' sales to asset ratios. Nakamura, Takahashi, and Vertinsky (2001:23) empirically explore "the determinants that led large Japanese manufacturers to (1) incorporate environmental goals in their decisions, (2) obtain environmental certification [...] , and (3) become early adopters of environmental certification."
This study concludes that in addition to firm size and factors that affect firm profits, environmental values, beliefs, and attitudes of managers are important determinants for voluntary environmental commitment of Japanese firms.
While both studies investigate the motivations for voluntary organizational innovation activities, such as adoption of EMS, Dasgupta et al. (2000) , Khanna and Anton (2002) as well as Anton et al. (2002) explain the variability in the quality of EMS, proxied by the count of environmental management practices. Moreover, Anton et al. (2002) measure the impact of EMS-certification on environmental performance -that is, the intensity of toxic emissions -, finding a significant reduction due to EMS adoption. Dasgupta et al. (2000) conclude that the voluntary adoption of ISO 14001 management practices significantly improves the compliance status of Mexican firms. These articles represent two of those few empirical studies that explore potential benefits of EMS-acquisition, such as improvement of environmental performance and stimulation of environmental innovation activities.
On the basis of abundant facility and firm-level data for German manufacturing originating from a recent OECD-survey, this paper empirically investigates the significance of a variety of incentives for environmentally innovative behavior, for example, the respective influence of pressure groups and the impact of both regulatory and market-based policy instruments, such as eco-taxes. In addition to the choice of single policy instruments, we also focus on aspects of policy style, such as the perception of policy stringency by firms. In detail, we address two issues: (1) What are the most relevant determinants for facilities to voluntarily adopt an EMS and (2) what triggers environmental innovation in facilities? Specifically, we test whether or not EMS-certification has a positive impact on the environmental innovation activities of a facility. This question is analyzed on the basis of a recursive bivariate probit model that explicitly takes into account that the decision on innovation activities within a facility may be correlated with the decision on EMS-certification. While it might be likely that environmentally innovative firms implement EMS-standards, we deliberately focus on the inverse question of the impact of EMS-certification on environmental innovation.
In the following section, we theoretically discuss potential determinants and impacts of environmental innovation and, specifically, EMS. Section 3 describes our data set, the sets of extracted variables, reflecting the impact of incentives, pressure groups, and policy instruments, and provides a concise descriptive summary of the survey results. Section 4 presents the conceptual framework, specifically the employed discrete choice model. Our estimation results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
Environmental Innovation, Regulation, and EMS
According to e. g. Kemp and Arundel (1998) , and Rennings and Zwick (2002) , the notion of environmental innovation encompasses new and modified processes, techniques, practices, systems and products that reduce or even avoid detrimental environmental impacts. Environmental innovation may or may not explicitly aim at reducing environmental harm and be motivated by typical business goals, such as profitability or enhancement of product quality. Many environmental innovations combine environmental benefits with benefits for companies and customers.
With this definition of environmental innovation, we emphasize the role of general innovations without environmental motivations, but with substantial environmental sideeffects. For example, the weight of computers has dramatically decreased over the past decades, leading to savings of energy and material per unit. Besides environmental aspects, this innovation process was also induced by consumer preferences for high-performing, flexible personal computers.
Environmental innovation can be divided into technical and organizational measures, such as EMS. Technical measures include new or modified products or processes. Up to now, the literature on the relation between environmental policy and technological change has mainly focused on the choice of optimal policy instruments to induce environmental innovations, see Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2002) . While market-based instruments have been regarded as superior for a long time (see Downing and White, 1986; Milliman and Prince, 1989) , modifications to this rule have been derived from general equilibrium models of endogenous growth and from game theoretic models.
The superiority of market-based instruments has been confirmed in situations with perfect competition and full information. Yet, the situation changes under imperfect competition. When firms gain "strategic advantages" from innovation, regulation standards may be more appropriate for stimulating innovation, see Carraro (2000) and Montero (2002) . Furthermore, under the assumption that technological innovation is endogenous, no instrument is generally preferable and the welfare gain of environmental policy instruments depends on different sets of circumstances, see Fischer, Parry, and Pizer (2003) .
Given that regulation is just one factor among many others affecting innovation decisions, and given that in most cases several instruments from various policy areas affect innovation decisions simultaneously, the basic question is whether or not the analysis and comparison of single policy instruments is a useful approach to find out the optimal policy stimulation of environmental innovation. An industrial economics approach that analyzes a range of determinants seems to be more appropriate -see e. g. Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) for such an approach.
In this context, Norberg-Bohm (1999) and Blazejczak et al. (1999) criticize "instrumentalism" in environmental policy, i.e., they criticize the assumption that it is the proper selection of the most appropriate policy instrument that guarantees policy success. According to these authors, important elements for successful environmental policy, such as the mix of instruments and different policy styles (including strictness), are not appreciated accordingly.
With particular respect to regulation as determinant of environmental innovation, the importance of strictness of environmental policy has been emphasized by the famous Porter hypothesis, for which a unanimous formulation, though, is missing -see Jaffe and Palmer (1997:610). Porter and van der Linde (1995a; 1995b) postulate "innovation offsets" of strict environmental policy, while Ashord, Ayers, and Stone (1985) argue that strict regulation can induce disruptive technological changes in firms. These arguments are based on a series of case studies, most prominently Porter and van der Linde (1995a; 1995b) . Up to now, there appears to be only a few econometric studies on the relationship between policy strictness and environmental innovation.
In the econometric work of both Jaffe and Palmer (1997) Traditionally, German environmental policy has emphasized mandatory regulation that prescribes limits on pollutant emissions or the use of specific abatement technology. While this kind of regulation certainly has protected the environment, it has also encouraged firms to focus on end-of-pipe technologies that control pollution at the factory smokestack or at the point of effluent discharge, rather than on preventing pollution.
Usually, mandatory regulation has also imposed high cost on both firms and regulators.
A growing belief in the need to provide flexibility to firms with respect to the efforts they spend on environmental protection -which is generally supposed to lower their cost -has led to an increasing number of voluntary initiatives to change corporate culture and management practices by incorporating environmental concerns in production decisions. These policy initiatives, which emphasize pollution prevention at the source as the preferred method of pollution control, include the voluntary adoption of EMS, which is assumed to enhance a firm's environmental innovation activity and, thus, improve environmental performance. This presumption, however, which is based on the implications of certification -such as the monitoring of environmental performance and the assessment of achievements -, has yet to be validated.
Data and Variables
Our facility and firm-level data set of German manufacturing was established within the context of a recent OECD-survey on environmental policy tools and their impact on firm management practices. The survey, which was performed in 2003 in 7 OECD-countries (Canada, Norway, Japan, USA, Hungary, Germany, and France), inquires about the adoption decision of facilities with respect to EMS and a specific kind of EMS: EMAS, ISO 14001, and/or other EMS. The German data set is based on 899 valid questionnaires, including more than forty questions with regard to facility-and firm-specific characteristics, environmental behavior, perception of the stringency of environmental regulation, etc.
Almost half of our sample, i.e. 437 out of 899 facilities, has considered introducing an EMS. 246 facilities have even established such a system already, while the implementation is in progress in 62 facilities. In our model, which is presented in the subsequent section, the dichotomous variable ems indicates whether or not the implementation of an EMS is in progress or has even been accomplished in a sample facility. The most important reasons why firms contemplate introducing EMS -according to our descriptive analysis of the answers of the respective question -are that the wish to foster corporate image, create cost savings with respect to both waste management and resource input, and increase efforts to achieve regulatory compliance.
Whether or not a facility has undertaken significant technical measures that reduce the environmental impacts associated with its activities, i. e. changes in production technologies and/or product characteristics, is captured by the dichotomous variable abate.
Total private expenditures on R&D and the number of successful patent applications are innovation activity measures that are typically employed in the economic literature -see e.g. Jaffe and Palmer (1997:611) . In the absence of patent data for our sample facilities, and because of insufficient data on R&D-expenditures related to environmental matters due to a lot of missing values, we identify environmental innovation by the variable abate, that is, by the observation of whether or not a facility has undertaken pollution abatement activities, irrespective of the type of measure, i. e. additive end-of-pipe technology versus process-integrated technology changes.
Both a facility's decision on EMS-certification and abatement activities depend on factors that are divided into the following four categories 
Conceptual Framework
Among all the aspects addressed in the standardized OECD-questionnaire, we empirically explore two issues: (1) What are the determinants for German manufacturing facilities to adopt an Environmental Management System (EMS) and (2) what triggers environmental innovation activities of these facilities? Specifically, we test whether or not EMS-certification has a positive impact on the environmental innovation (= abatement) activities of industrial facilities. These questions are investigated on the basis of a model that explicitly takes into account that the decision on environmental innovation or abatement activities within a facility is most likely correlated with the decision on EMS-certification;
i. e., we analyze these issues on the basis of a system of two discrete-choice models with normally distributed and correlated disturbances. Our model is formulated as a system of two latent-variable equations: one for a facility's abatement decision and a second for the EMS adoption decision. The abatement decision is deliberately assumed to explicitly depend on the EMS-adoption decision.
In formal terms, we assume that a facility's propensity for abatement activities, abate * i , depends on, in particular, ems i , the actual implementation of an EMS in facility i, whereas facility i's propensity for EMS-acquisition, ems * i , is not affected by the abatement propensity abate * i or actual abatement:
where η and ξ are normally distributed vectors with zero mean. Both sets of regressors x i and y i include variables belonging to the four categories of variables described in the previous section. Note that this recursive simultaneous-equation model will be logically inconsistent if the EMS-adoption equation (2) contains abate * i , facility i's abatement propensity -see e. g. Maddala (1983) for more details on simultaneous discrete-choice models.
The propensities abate * i and ems * i are typically unobservable. Instead, only binary choices are observed. Therefore, we need to impose the conditions V ar(η) = I, V ar(ξ) = I, where I denotes the unity matrix. Moreover, Cov(η, ξ) = ρI = 0, with ρ reflecting a nonideosyncratic correlation of both decisions in firms -see e. g. Maddala (1983:122) for this specific kind of model, which is often called a recursive model. It is most likely that the disturbances η i and ξ i are correlated, since these disturbances may capture unobserved variables, such as the "green" preferences of the management, that would affect both the abatement and adoption decision. Moreover, note that the set of observable variables x i in abatement decision equation (1) is partly common to the set of regressors y i in EMSadoption equation (2), but not identical. If both sets x i and y i do not differ in at least one variable, and if η and ξ are not independent, the parameters in (1) are not identified -see Maddala (1983:122) .
Rather than observing the propensities abate * i and ems * i , merely the corresponding actions -that is, the actual implementation of EMS, indicated by ems i =1, and actual abatement activities, abate i = 1 -can be observed, provided that these propensities exceed a certain threshold, which is -without any loss of generality -commonly set at zero:
From an economic perspective, the interpretation of condition (3) is that a profitmaximizing firm or facility adopts an EMS, ems i =1, if the net benefit due to EMSacquisition is positive:
In economic terms, the propensity ems * i of facility i to adopt an EMS is identified by the net benefit. This unobservable net benefit is determined by observable factors, such as image improvements, that are captured in vector y i , as well as by unobservable factors that are summarized in disturbance ξ i . Specifically, condition (5) implies that the expected net benefit is positive: E(ems * i ) > 0. Of course, similar interpretations hold for environmental innovation activities: A profit-maximizing facility invests in abatement measures,
Generally, bivariate probit models are estimated by using Full-Information Maximum-Likelihood (FIML)-methods. On the basis of this estimation procedure, surprisingly little attention needs to be paid to the endogenous nature of ems i in equation (1): It is correct to simply ignore the simultaneity in our model by treating ems i as if it were an exogenous variable. The straightforward explanation for this procedure is given by e. g. Greene (2000:849) and is based on the fact that the term P (abate i = 1|ems i = 1)·P (ems i = 1), for instance, that enters the log-likelihood equals the joint probability P (abate i = 1, ems i = 1). Note, in particular, that two-stage procedures -similar to two-stage least squares in linear simultaneous-equations models, for which one first performs a probit ML-estimation of equation (2) and then substitutes Φ(z iδ ) for ems i -would not provide consistent estimates of the parameters of the abatement decision equation (1) -see Maddala (1983:123) . Of course, if unobservable heterogeneity is such that the disturbance vectors η and ξ are independent, one can obtain consistent estimates by estimating both equations separately and using ordinary single-equation probit ML methods. Yet, we do not know whether or not this is the case unless we test the null-hypothesis H 0 : θ = 0 upon FIML-estimation of system (1) and (2).
Empirical Results
Estimation results for our recursive bivariate probit model are reported in Table 1 . First of all, on the basis of a Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test, we cannot reject the hypothesis H 0 : ρ = 0:
Upon accounting for the influence of all factors included in equations (1) and (2) of the t ratio for ρ, we come up with the same assumption. Due to the large number of variables included in both equations and owing to quite a number of missing values for some of these variables -for instance for polstrg, the survey respondents' impression of environmental regulation stringency -the remaining number of observations employed in the estimation amounts to 710, rather than 899, the overall number of valid questionnaires.
In line with the stylized facts presented in the previous section, our estimation results indicate that an expected amelioration of the corporate image represents a strong incentive for EMS-certification. By contrast, neither compliance with environmental regulation nor stringency of policy instruments (polstrg) seem to be important for this decision. Expected cost savings that may be created by the deployment an EMS also turn out to be irrelevant. Furthermore, our econometric analysis reveals that among pressure groups internal stake-holders appear to significantly influence the decision on the establishment of both EMS and abatement measures. Apart from public authorities, which are likely to push abatement activities, external forces, such as customers, do not seem to be influential with respect to both decisions. It is also surprising that none of the various single environmental policy tools included in our model, whether market-based or regulation-based instruments, appears to have any impact on a facility's decision in favor of EMS and pollution abatement.
With particular respect to the importance of EMS-certification for environmental pollution, our estimation results do not indicate any significant impact of EMS on a facility's abatement activities. Rather, as one might expect, these activities are most likely triggered by strong environmental impacts of a facility's production processes: More polluting facilities seem to be more inclined to innovate and abate than less polluting facilities.
Moreover, we find empirical evidence that the strictness of environmental policy has an impact on environmental innovation and abatement activities. This finding supports the hypothesis that policy style is more important for innovation that single policy instruments.
Not surprisingly, the existence of at least one employee who is explicitly responsible for environmental concerns, indicated by the dummy variable persenv, has a statistically significant positive impact on the likelihood of the introduction of both abatement activities and EMS within a facility. The existence of an environmental or a related department, indicated by envdept, positively affects only EMS-certification, yet not pollution abatement activities. In perfect accord with the previous section, which reports that EMS-adoption is strongly correlated with facility size: EMS-certification more likely occurs in larger facilities that rather possess the capacity for such an organizational environmental innovation, whereas larger facilities do not seem to spend more effort on abatement activities. Whether or not a facility has a budget for research and development related to environmental matters, indicated by the dummy variable facrdenv, does not significantly stimulate pollution abatement activities. In order to circumvent identification problems, which will occur if both sets x i and y i do not differ at least in one variable and if η and ξ are not independent, we have assumed that the existence of such an R&D budget does not affect the decision on EMS-adoption. Hence, facrdenv has only been included in abatement equation (1), but omitted in the ems-certification equation (2). Finally and not surprisingly, there are industry-specific differences: EMS-certification seems to be much more common in the chemical and plastic products sector, for instance, than in other industries.
Because the null-hypothesis H 0 : θ = 0 cannot be rejected, and thus we have to assume that the disturbance vectors η and ξ of equations (1) and (2) Table 2 . In qualitative terms, our single equation estimation results reiterate the pattern that can already be observed in Table 1 . concerns -seem to be crucial for the decision in favor of EMS-certification. Besides general policy stringency and the influence of public authorities, these internal factors are most likely the driving forces for a facility's abatement activities. In sum, we do not find any empirical evidence for the hypothesis that the choice of a single policy instrument determines environmental innovation behavior of firms. It is the policy style, including the mix of instruments and policy stringency, that seems to be more important.
Summary and Conclusion
The major questions addressed in this paper are: (1) How can public authorities support the introduction of, specifically, Environmental Management Systems (EMS), which can be interpreted as an organizational environmental and technical innovation that may lead to improved environmental performance, and (2) what are the characteristics of an efficient design of public environmental policies that aim at stimulating environmentally innovative behavior of firms? Specifically, we focus on the role that market forces and regulation play in the process of complex firm decisions on innovation and environmental performance, which requires a profound knowledge about firms' decision-making procedures and organizational structures.
Our empirical results indicate that the voluntary adoption of EMS appears to be exclusively spurred by facility-related internal factors and incentives, such as potential amelioration of the corporate image, whereas neither external pressure groups, such as public authorities and customers, nor any single policy instrument tend to push EMScertification. Thus, in order to enhance voluntary adoption of EMS, environmental policy is well-advised to stimulate internal factors, for instance through support programmes for EMS in firms, including training for employees and benefits for firms that are already validated, e. g. through the opportunity to employ certification as a marketing instrument for firms.
In addition to internal factors and incentives, which affect both EMS-certification and environmental innovation activities of facilities, the influence of public authorities and the strictness of environmental policy are crucial catalysts for innovation and abatement activities. Based on ample empirical evidence originating from facility and firm-level data set of German manufacturing, we find support for the argument that factors of policy style, such as the stringency of their design and implementation, trigger firm decisions in favor of innovation and abatement activities.
By contrast, neither EMS-certification nor any other single policy instrument, appear to affect environmental innovation decisions. This is in line with King and Lenox (2000) , who hypothesize that the adoption of an EMS may insulate firms from stakeholder pressure, but does not necessarily trigger environmental innovation. In the absence of sanctions for lack of improvement, firms may develop an EMS to disguise poor performance and avoid regulatory scrutiny, Nash and Ehrenfeld (2001) presume, but do not undertake the effort required to really improve environmental performance. According to Anton et al. (2002: 2), EMS do not necessarily guarantee an improvement of the environmental performance, since most EMS solely focus on the means -that is, the proactive efforts for pollution control -rather than the ends -that is, the actual environmental performance. et. al (2002:26) also find that none of the market-based or regulatory pressures considered have a significant direct impact on the pollution intensity of firms. Rather, their effect is indirect and operates through the adoption of a higher quality EMS that, in turn, has a significant negative impact on the intensity of toxic releases. In sum, on the basis of this paper's empirical results, we conclude that policy style, that is, policy stringency, policy implementation, and co-ordination of different measures, deserves at least as much attention in environmental politics as the choice of a single policy instrument. or not the corporate image is a very important motivation for environmental practices of a facility. There are two exceptions to this rule: polstrg = 1 indicates whether respondents describe the general policy regime as very stringent, while polstrg = 0 means moderately or not particularly stringent. impacts = 1 indicates very negative environmental impacts of a facility's products and production process with respect to at least one of the following issues: water effluents, air pollution waste generation, etc. 
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